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The annals of science are filled with successes. Only in footnotes do we hear about the
failures, the cul-de-sacs, and the forgotten ideas. Failure is how research advances. Yet
it hardly features in theoretical perspectives on science. That is a mistake. Failures,
whether clear-cut or ambiguous, are heuristically fruitful in their own right. Thinking
about failure questions our measures of success, including the conceptual foundations
of current practice, that can only be transient in an experimental context. This article
advances the heuristics of failure analysis, meaning the explicit treatment of certain
ideas or models as failures. The value of failures qua being a failure is illustrated with the
example of grandmother cells; the contested idea of a hypothetical neuron that encodes
a highly specific but complex stimulus, such as the image of one’s grandmother.
Repeatedly evoked in popular science and maintained in textbooks, there is sufficient
reason to critically review the theoretical and empirical background of this idea.
Keywords: philosophy of science, gnostic units, model pluralism, object recognition, history of science,
localization, sparse coding, localist theory
INTRODUCTION: WHY TALK ABOUT FAILURE IN SCIENCE?
Science fails. It seems to fail at a high rate and with regularity. Experiments go wrong,
measurements do not deliver the anticipated results, probes are contaminated, models are
misleadingly simplistic or not representative, and some inappropriately applied techniques lead
to false positives. One may wonder why science is so successful despite such prevalent failures. The
alternative is to suggest that it is successful because of them.
Instead of a hindrance to scientific progress, a frequently overlooked positive characteristic
of science is that it inevitably must fail to achieve an important job it sets out to do: discovery.
For scientific research to exceed our initial modeling assumptions and to continuously supersede
our ever-adjusting experimental limits, things have to go wrong. How science deals with failures
may be more characteristic of the extraordinary nature of the scientific enterprise than its way of
coping with successes.
It is one thing to say that science fails and that we should think about the decisive role of failures.
It is another to highlight the particular aspects of failure that benefit our concrete dealing with
science. Different attitudes toward science from the practitioner to the non-expert are the easiest
to situate the lack of understanding of failure’s role in the scientific process. Such divergence of
attitudes is apparent when it comes to the status of the scientific method. The scientific method
is our most popular characterization and explanation for the success of science. But it has limits
when it comes to reality. Being a traditional analytical tool and teaching device, it also paints
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a problematic picture of science because it never makes explicit
the ubiquitous presence and influence of failures at the laboratory
bench and modeling board (Medarwar, 1959/1999; Firestein,
2015; Schickore, in review).
This has several negative consequences of importance
for theoretical perspectives on science. Intentionally or
unintentionally it leaves laypeople with a distorted view of
the changeable dynamics of empirical research; it perverts
education policy and the methods of teaching science; moreover,
it undermines the funding of science as a social contract. Indeed,
one central danger coming from this lack of making the necessity
of failure explicit is the increasing distance between the realities
of scientific practice and its perception in the public and by
funding bodies (O’Malley et al., 2009). Perhaps most pernicious,
it further drives scientists to embrace a science that must prove
its worth and restrict its inquisitiveness by counting its successes.
Not all of these problems will be solved by accepting failure
as an inevitable, even required outcome of scientific practice.
But all of these problems arise from our avoidance of failure.
No solutions to these problems will present themselves until we
first alter the view of failure as negative and better understand
the precise role it plays in making science successful. One area
where this can be accomplished with relative ease, and where
the philosophy and history of science can serve an essential
complementary role, is in our science narratives and analysis
(Chang, 2004, 2012; Morgan and Norton, 2017; Schickore, 2018).
These reconstructions are often in the form of “arcs of discovery”
in which a long line of crucial discoveries seem to line up in
perfect order and lead directly to fresh insight. But they are less
than half of the story (Root-Bernstein, 1988, 1989). The failures,
the errors, the cul-de-sacs, the long periods of being stumped,
the “barking up the wrong tree” - all of these play a crucial role
in revealing how science works, must work to produce the deep
explanations that finally result (Firestein, 2012, 2015).
What makes failure in science theoretically interesting?
Dealing with failures constitutes an active engagement with
the limits of understanding. Successes primarily enforce current
research strategies and models. Failures encourage us to broaden
our perspectives on the nature of a particular problem and to
open exploration to alternatives. Notably, this view amounts
to more than merely saying ‘failure forces you to think of
something new.’
Evaluating certain ideas explicitly as failures offers concrete
guidance to a more interesting question, namely: How to
think of something new? The heuristic function of failure in
science can be illustrated with the case of “grandmother cells”
in neuroscience. The idea of grandmother cells describes a
hypothetical neuron which encodes and responds to a highly
specific but complex stimulus, such as one’s grandmother
(Barlow, 2009). Current neuroscience has not disproved but
mainly forgotten about this idea, yet it occasionally resurfaces in
popular science. What fresh insights into higher-level processing
can the concept of grandmother cells offer when analyzed
as a failure?
The article proceeds as follows. The next section introduces
the historical origins of grandmother cells before breaking down
the different lines of evidence and challenges involved in their
investigation. Following this is a critical evaluation of why the
idea of grandmother cells can be considered a failure, and how
this treatment also informs theoretical perspectives on science,
especially for the avoidance of relativism in the presence of
model pluralism. The paper concludes with a broader outlook
on how thinking about failure informs science, including science
communication and funding.
GRANDMOTHER CELLS, AN ALMOST
SUCCESSFUL IDEA
Historical Origins
The term “grandmother cell” originated with the famous
neuroscientist Jerome Lettvin. In 1969, during a lecture to
students at MIT, Lettvin mockingly illustrated the hypothesis that
complex concepts might have localized neural representations
with an anecdote about a fictional Russian neurosurgeon, Akakhi
Akakhevich. Akakhevich was called to see the protagonist
of Philip Roth’s novel Portnoy’s Complaint. Portnoy had
a troubled relationship with his mother, and Akakhevich
treated him by identifying and removing those brain cells
responsible for encoding Portnoy’s memory of his mother. Post
operation, Akakhevich remarked that the patient comprehended
the concept of “mother”, yet lost all associations with his
mother. Lettvin mused that, encouraged by his success,
Akakhevich moved on to the study of “grandmother cells”
(Barlow, 1995, 2009).
Starting as a joke, the term spread quickly in the 1970s,
periodically revived in later decades. Initially dismissed (Barlow,
1972), a couple of first experimental results lent the idea some
plausibility (Perrett et al., 1982; Rolls, 1984; Yamane et al., 1988;
Gross, 2002). What fostered appeal to the possible existence of
grandmother cells?
Grandmother cells were an embodiment of the neuroscience
Zeitgeist of the 1960s to ‘80s; their allure was their metaphorical
potential. Of course, metaphors have a long tradition in scientific
reasoning (Hesse, 1966; Bailer-Jones, 2002). Consider Dalton’s
“billiard ball model” or Rutherford’s “solar system model” of
the atom. These constituted powerful images, which brought
current lines of empirical evidence under a theoretical umbrella.
Similarly, the concept of grandmother cells encapsulated several
prominent research hypotheses in early neuroscience as a
burgeoning field (Shepherd, 2009). These hypotheses could be
subsumed under the question of how, after initial sensory
processing, information gets integrated at later stages in central
processing (Hubel and Wiesel, 1979).
What granted grandmother cells empirical plausibility? Three
hypotheses stood out (Figure 1). First, it turned out that
brain cells are choosy; they respond selectively only to specific
kinds of input. Over the first half of the twentieth century,
such specificity of neural responses was supported by emerging
empirical evidence for labeled line coding, with neurons and
anatomical areas responding selectively to specific stimuli
(Adrian and Matthews, 1927). Second, evidence for selective
neural activity soon was tied to the idea of localization, the
assumption that highly specialized cells formed clusters and
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FIGURE 1 | Multiple lines of empirical evidence line unified to a unified phenomenon by the conceptual proxy of grandmother cells.
aggregated in some regions of the brain. Lesion studies by
Karl H. Pribram and Mortimer Mishkin (Pribram and Mishkin,
1955; Mishkin, 1966), the discovery of cortical columns by
Mountcastle (1957), and the cat striate cortex experiments
by Hubel and Wiesel (1962, 1965) were at the core of this
development. Although called into question in recent years,
localization as a paradigm persists today (Burnston, 2016). Third,
it transpired that stimulus processing involved the hierarchical
convergence of neural signals. Basically, the higher-level the stage
of processing in the brain, the more specialized its output.
The visual pathway presented an excellent model for this idea
(Marr, 1982; Hubel, 1988). Inference from cells coding for edges,
shapes, and junctions facilitating stable object recognition (Oram
and Perrett, 1994) to, eventually, object-specific cells – firing
in the presence of tables and perhaps individual people – was
at least at hand.
Implications surrounding the existence of grandmother
cells proved tempting, with one question taking center stage:
Could this concept resolve the fundamental issue of whether
neural representations of objects, including the specialization
of cell responses, were more or less hard-wired (Hubel and
Wiesel, 1963) or learned (Blakemore and Cooper, 1970)?
The psychologist Rose (1996, 881), who trained under Colin
Blakemore, remarked: “The reason I thought ‘grandmother cell’
such as good term was that it implied that, if the theory were
true, each of us would have different wiring for our grandmother
cells; hence this wiring could not be innate.” The term had
heuristic potential.
Evidence for such type of cell remained indirect, however.
This was not a surprise. To be sure, the concept’s metaphorical
origins did not fool scientists to hold strong ontological
beliefs about the existence of literal grandmother cells. Rather,
the persistence of this term in neuroscientific imagination
sometimes mirrored a lack of credible alternatives, as Hubel
and Wiesel (1979, 52) found: “What happens beyond the
primary visual area, and how is the information on orientation
exploited at later stages? Is one to imagine ultimately finding
a cell that responds specifically to some very particular
item? (Usually one’s grandmother is selected as the particular
item, for reasons that escape us.) Our answer is that
we doubt there is such a cell, but we have no good
alternative to offer.”
The Concept and Its Name,
Demetaphored
The concept of grandmother cells began as a humorous anecdote.
It soon became a metaphor for the research strategy of
an expanding neuroscience before it participated in scientific
discourse as a genuine term. Indeed we find the idea of
grandmother cells still discussed in modern textbooks of
cognitive neuroscience (Gazzaniga and Ivry, 2013), albeit with
reference to its hypothetical character. What might account for
such deceptive success?
The question needs reframing: Was the unlikely success of
grandmother cells really an indicator of the general success of the
field or, maybe, a sign of its stagnation? By the 1970s, and 80s,
when the concept of grandmother cells took off (Gross, 2002; see
also Figure 2), the revolutionary developments in mid-twentieth
century neuroscience temporarily came to a halt. From a broader
perspective, the vision scientist Marr (1982, 14) observed: “But
somewhere underneath, something was going wrong. The initial
discoveries of the 1950s and 1960s were not being followed by
equally dramatic discoveries in the 1970s. No neurophysiologists
had recorded new and clear high-level correlates of perception.”
Marr identified the lack of proper theory as a problem; answers
about mind and brain could not be found on a single cell level, as
champions of grandmother cells had suggested (Barlow, 1972),
but required a framework of the general processes of neuronal
signaling. Physiologists diligently measured single cell responses,
without arriving at the bigger picture of signal coding that
these recordings ought to convey. In response, in his landmark
publication Vision, Marr (1982) proposed a computational
understanding of perceptual processing that would invigorate
and shape research in neuroscience in the following decades
(Glennerster, 2007; Bickle, 2015). Meanwhile, the concept of
grandmother cells seemed to encapsulate the stalled success of the
assumptive framework of convergent, hierarchical, and localized
signal integration – as a vague enough proxy for a conceptual
space without proper theory or mechanistic explanation.
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FIGURE 2 | (Data source: Google NGram): Frequency comparison of the keywords “grandmother cell,” “gnostic unit,” and “sparse coding” in the years between
1950 and 2008.
The legitimacy of the concept grounded in its epistemic
accessibility and descriptive function. Complex processes of
signal construction could be described as sequential, linear, and
mirroring common sense about mental concepts representing
real-world objects (such as grandmothers and tables). This
descriptive appeal of grandmother cells stood in stark contrast
with preliminary idealized computational frameworks like
McCulloch and Pitts (1943) that count as early predecessors of
contemporary neural network models (Piccinini, 2004). Signal
coding in binary code did not necessitate a physical localization
of cognitive objects in neural space. Still, thinking globally about
the brain in terms of information processing was abstract and,
as yet, also too detached from research on its physiological basis
(Gefter, 2015). By contrast, grandmother cells carried an air of
concrete physicality and experimental discoverability.
But what of explanation? Explanation differs from description
in the sense that it targets the mechanisms, the causal basis,
that underpins a phenomenon (Machamer et al., 2000; Craver,
2007). Now, it is not uncommon for scientific concepts to
start as proxies or conceptual placeholders. Such proxies
enable scientists to describe separately observed but potentially
connected phenomena under an umbrella term, even though
the existence of that entity is purely speculative at the time.
The success of such proxies in an experimental context hinges
on their empirical consolidation and degree of manipulability,
meaning their progressive entrenchment in an experimental
context that allows identifying particular functions and physical
structures with specific observable effects. Simply put: when
heuristic descriptions manifest as causal explanations (e.g., see
the history of cell surface receptors in Barwich and Bschir, 2017).
Grandmother cells lacked such explanatory basis. One reason
for this shortcoming was that it was unclear what grandmother
cells actually were; specifically, to what processes they referred.
Because a central problem with the term was its conceptual
murkiness. That did not stop this term from being used as a
popular metaphor: “The term is flippant, incomplete, and not
quite accurate, but it is widely understood, and I shall stick with
it.” (Barlow, 2009, 313).
As intuitive the metaphor of grandmother cells was to
common sense, as ambiguous was its translation into a valid
scientific term. Unlike other metaphors in science, the concept
of grandmother cells was never successfully demetaphored;
“demetaphorization” referring to the epistemic process by which
a discourse community standardizes a term (Temmerman, 1995;
English, 1998). Scientific terms are highly specific, and their
application tailored to a modeling task and target system. (Such
specificity does not conflict with scientific concepts undergoing
conceptual change or cross-domain variation; Barnes, 1982;
Temmerman, 2000; Barwich, 2013.) Grandmother cells were
opaque both on a theoretical as well as a practical level, which
severely impeded their assessment.
From an empirical viewpoint, it was undetermined what kind
of information or signal was processed and integrated with
such a hypothetical neuron. For example, did grandmother cells
only respond to visual input, or did they also process cross-
modal cues, including auditory and olfactory signals? (After all,
many people find that odors vividly connect to their memory of
places and people; for example, the smell of one’s grandmother’s
house; the aroma of her home-cooked food; and perhaps her
perfume.) It was unclear whether (and if so where) there
is such centrum of learned, cross-modal integration. In one
way of another, this puzzle mirrored a broader challenge in
research on signal integration that is generally discussed as the
“binding problem” in cognitive neuroscience (Treisman, 1996;
Roskies, 1999; Holcombe, 2009): How does unified phenomenal
experience arise from separated and specialized neural processes?
Besides, how stable or flexible was such hypothetical neuron in
recognizing an individual entity, such as one’s grandmother, as
being the same entity over time. If we haven’t seen someone
in years, even decades, we often can pick out that person (in
real life but also in photographs). What information or features
grandmother cells were picking up was far from obvious.
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From a theoretical perspective, the scope of the concept of
grandmother cells was not clear-cut either. If describing an actual
neuron, would grandmother cells respond only to a particular
individual (my grandmother), or to several entities falling under
the same category (a grandmother)? The origins in Lettvin’s
story suggest the former. However, these fictional origins were
largely unknown before the mid-nineties (Barlow, 1995) and,
in practice, the two meanings were not always separated but
frequently mentioned alongside each other (Gross, 2002; Barlow,
2009; Plaut and McClelland, 2010).
This was no coincidence, since the idea of concept-specific
cells lured in the background. The notion of concept-specific
cells was proposed, somewhat independently, at the same time as
Lettvin’s grandmother cells. Sealed off behind the Iron Curtain,
the Polish neurophysiologist Konorski (1967) had advanced
the idea of “gnostic units,” forming “gnostic fields.” Konorski’s
gnostic units soon were associated with recordings of localized
responses to complex objects, such as faces (Perrett et al., 1987).
And more experimental evidence emerged for object-specific
activity in neural domains, involved in the perception of objects
or categories such as hands, locations, or emotional expressions
(Gross, 1998). These findings further resonated with the broader
philosophical tendency in favor of the modularity of cognition
and its neural underpinnings (Fodor, 1985).
Perhaps its theoretical ambiguity granted the concept of
grandmother cells some momentum with empirical support,
since both concepts, grandmother cells and gnostic units, seemed
sufficiently similar. However, they are not.
It is important to keep these two concepts apart because
they are not co-extensive in their application and do not imply
the same processes: “if we were persuaded that grandmother
cells do not exist, that would not be a reason for concluding
that localist cells do not exist” (Coltheart, 2016). Recordings
of localized responses can result from different mechanisms
of information encoding. Conceptual blending of grandmother
with gnostic cells thus could filter out relevant distinctions
that may suggest another explanation via a different kind of
mechanism (see section “Making Other Explanations Explicit:
From Grandmother Cells to Sparse Coding”).
Curiously then, the difficulty with grandmother cells lies not in
their metaphorical framing or descriptive content per se, but how
this concept influences the explanatory structure of arguments on
signal coding. On this account, we will see next that the failure
that characterizes the idea of grandmother cells is not its lack of
direct experimental support or any form of apparent falsification.
Many scientific concepts survive, even thrive, despite prolonged
absence of empirical support. Instead, it is the neutralization of
significant distinctions in causal explanations that would have
implied and strengthened “unconceived alternatives” (a term by
Stanford, 2006).
FAILURE ANALYSIS ADVANCES
PLURALISM WITHOUT RELATIVISM
Should grandmother cells be considered a failure? The answer
is not straightforward. That is precisely why this concept
makes for an illustrative case. Grandmother cells are not an
indisputable failure if we center our philosophical perspective
on the justification of epistemic norms that undergird scientific
practice, including the benefits of dissent (e.g., see debates in
social epistemology; Longino, 2019). Indeed grandmother cells
might be considered to represent a perfectly legitimate idea if
we adopt a pluralist perspective. As an example, the philosopher
and historian of science Chang (2012) provided a convincing
argument about the Chemical Revolution: why it would have
been beneficial to keep the old chemical principle of phlogiston
alive next to the new chemistry of oxygen (in short: because
it pointed toward observations that later were associated with
electrochemical phenomena and thus may have accelerated
these findings).
So why speak of failure then?
Failure Meets Pluralism at the Dilemma
of Choice
Hardly anything in scientific practice constitutes an obvious
failure, except (and even) in hindsight. A look at the history
of science tells us that many concepts we consider as failed
today were never explicitly disproven. Routinely, these concepts
merely faded in their relevance or heuristic power, replaced by
alternative explanations. Disproving speculative ideas is not as
easy a job as it sounds. Negative results need not be conclusive
proof against a model.
Failure in scientific practice is a much more ambiguous
notion than traditional ideas of falsifiability or null hypotheses.
Schickore, a philosopher and historian of science, for instance
distinguished between four interpretations of failure: omission;
breakdown; not meeting one’s goal; and personal failure. Two
kinds of failure are instructive in a scientific and educational
context: (1) the “failure to follow a known and generally
acknowledged rule or to miss a specific goal or target,” and (2)
going amiss as the “stories of struggle, setbacks, and stagnation”
which “by contrast, are about scientists finding themselves
in situations where nobody knows what to do and what is right”
(Schickore, in review). The second type of failure is less clear
but permeates everyday science beyond the benefits of historical
wisdom. Moreover, it is not only less evident as a failure, but also
has no appropriate rule by which to proceed or change course.
The next section presents the story of grandmother cells as
an expression of the second type of failure. On this account, we
must wonder what determines the threshold of reasonable doubt
to find that an idea may have turned into a dead end, and how to
conceive of reasonable alternatives. Surely, some ideas are dead
ends, and it matters to lay such ideas to rest because their faux
success might obscure inquiry into better-suited, more fruitful
lines of investigation. Moreover, the false appearance of success
of some ideas can seriously distort theoretical perspectives on the
advancement and objectives of an experimental system. A case
in point is the debate surrounding the pseudo-controversy of the
“quantum nose” (Barwich, 2018a); here, a misconception of what
constitutes the empirical success of a model led to a fundamental
gap between specialist and non-practitioner views on evidence,
including a field’s progression. Such concerns should matter if we
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aim to advance theoretical perspectives, such as in the philosophy
of science, as complementary to science (Chang, 2004) or as
“explication work”: including the philosophical “analysis of how
scientific concepts and practices have developed,” and “the
explication and clarification of our analytic tools” in science
studies (Schickore, 2018, 19 and 16). This is why we need to talk
about failure in science.
From this perspective, focusing on the notion of failure first
sounds like a challenge to pluralism. Scientific pluralism is the
philosophical view that science is most progressive when it
maintains and works with various, sometimes even conflicting
models and methods (Kellert et al., 2006). Speaking of failure
seems to imply the opposite: that we drop concepts that are
considered false or are in dire conflict with other models.
However, this opposition is misleading.
Pluralism and failure meet at the dilemma of choice. A general
objection directed at scientific pluralism is its abundance of
options, which opens up concerns of relativism, as Chang
(2012, 261) observed: “The fear of relativism, and its conflation
with pluralism, will not go away easily. The objection comes
back, in a different guise: ‘If you go with pluralism, how do
you choose what to believe?’ Well, how do you choose in
any case?” (emphasis in original) Pluralism does not preclude
choice but suggests that choices are not exclusive, whether
such decisions concern the selection of questions, methods,
models, or hypotheses. Failure analysis aids in identifying and
making such choices.
Making Other Explanations Explicit:
From Grandmother Cells to Sparse
Coding
This is where we get back to our case study. Effectively,
grandmother cells never became a success. Hubel (1988)
explicitly rejected the notion, as did others. But the idea did not
simply die either. While some neuroscientists suggested that it is
about time to lay this concept to rest (Sejnowski, 2014), attempts
to recover grandmother cells appealed to their plausibility
(Bowers, 2009). Yet, reasoning from empirical possibility is too
weak a criterion of success and, in the case of grandmother cells,
not as robust as Bowers suggests (Plaut and McClelland, 2010).
What fueled the resurrection of grandmother cells? In the past
couple of decades, the idea received regular revival in popular
science; you may have heard about the so-called “Halle Berry
neuron” or “Jennifer Aniston cell” (e.g., Gosline, 2005; Khamsi,
2005; Gaschler, 2006). These reports cover the discovery of single
neurons in humans that respond selectively to various visual
representations of individual people (i.e., different images of a
person, but also their written names), as well as other highly
specific objects, including iconic places such as the Sydney Opera
House (Quiroga et al., 2005, 2008, 2009).
Could these neurons be the mythical grandmother cells?
Science writers quickly made the connection. Yet the more
cautious among them begged to differ: “Quian Quiroga does not,
however, believe these neurons are grandmother cells, at least as
they were initially conceived” (Zimmer, 2009).
Quiroga et al.’s recordings showed a number of cells that
indeed responded to particular individual entities in a strikingly
selective manner. However, a closer look at these findings
suggests a substantially different model of stimulus coding
and memorization than that in support of grandmother cells.
Specifically, as the authors themselves emphasized – upfront in
one of the publication titles – their discovery revealed Sparse
but not ‘Grandmother-cell’ coding in the medial temporal lobe
(Quiroga et al., 2008). Drawing that difference is crucial.
Specialized responses to particular objects such as faces or
hands have more recently been explained in terms of sparse
coding (Quiroga et al., 2013). Sparse coding denotes the effective
activation of a small group of neurons. In contrast with
grandmother cells, and instead of a particular cell, the process
of sparse coding implies pattern activity measurable in temporal
and spatial dimensions, as well as firing strength. Notably,
the hypothesis of sparse coding has taken over prevalence in
comparison to grandmother cells over the past twenty years
(Figure 2). What constitutes the difference in coding between
grandmother cells and sparse coding?
One significant difference is that sparse coding is not exclusive.
Neurons might fire selectively in response to highly specific
stimuli, such as Halle Berry. But this is not the only stimulus to
which they respond. Additionally, sparse coding does not show
the encoding of particular stimuli as separate or isolated entities.
Instead, it builds a network of associations between familiar items:
While a limited number of neurons responded to specific stimuli
(say, pictures of Jennifer Aniston), these cells also responded
selectively to specific stimuli known from the same context
(namely, Lisa Kudrow, the actress starring next to Aniston in the
sitcom Friends). Alternatively, should we think of sparse coding
in terms of concept cells or gnostic units then?
At this point, the earlier suggested difference between
grandmother cells and gnostic units comes into play. The model
of sparse coding seems to resonate with Konorski’s idea of
gnostic units. Notably, Konorski (1967) proposal was markedly
different from grandmother cells. To show this, we first need
to separate the mechanistic explanation of “concept cells” in
terms of sparse coding from the descriptive function of the
grandmother cell idea. The descriptive function of grandmother
cells was its role as a proxy in a linear model of hierarchical
object coding, where simpler signals turned into higher-level
representations via cells responding to ever more complex signals
(Hubel, 1988; Gazzaniga and Ivry, 2013). In comparison, sparse
coding can but need not imply linear or hierarchical stimulus
encoding; it is not co-extensive with the principles of input-
driven object recognition.
In fact, sparse coding indicates an entirely different
theory of neural representation. Sets of neurons build a
net of learned associations, potentially unrelated in their
feature-coding pathways (e.g., information from edge
detection merges with auditory input). These sets do not
code concepts strictly bottom-up, from simple signals to complex
individuals or categories. Rather, stimulus representation
might be governed by multiple organizational principles,
including top-down effects and statistical frequency next to
bottom-up coding.
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Three observations exemplify the difference. First, the cell that
responded selectively to Bill Clinton did not fire in response
to images of other United States presidents (Quiroga et al.,
2005). So these cells were not simply neural representations
of semantic categories and conceptual clusters. Second, when
faced with ambiguous stimuli, such as the image of Bill Clinton
morphing into George Bush, neural responses mirrored the
subjective reports of the participant. In other words, the activity
of these neurons did not correlate with stimulus similarity, but
the subjective perceptual judgment about stimulus similarity by
the participants (Quiroga et al., 2014). Third, unrelated stimuli
presented in close temporal proximity could become associated
under a familiar concept, such as verbal with visual cues like
names with faces (Reddy and Thorpe, 2014). This indicates a
substantially different causal mechanism in the formation of
concept cells than the idea of grandmother cells.
The new line of inquiry emerging from these developments is:
What are the association mechanisms that govern an individual’s
learning of similarity as familiarity relations between highly
specific stimuli and, further, their encoding into long-term
memory under particular categories? An answer to this question
requires a theoretical framework different from the reasoning
that fueled the idea and plausibility of grandmother cells.
To conclude this point, grandmother cells and sparse coding
share one central hypothesis; localization. But localization is not
self-explanatory and can be an expression of various mechanisms
of stimulus encoding (Coltheart, 2016). The crucial difference
between grandmother cells and sparse coding thus is that the
idea of grandmother cells emerged as a direct consequence
of the hierarchical coding hypothesis. In comparison, sparse
coding does not necessitate hierarchical coding; it primarily
builds on a theory of learning, especially associative learning
(Reddy and Thorpe, 2014).
(Why) This Idea Won’t Simply Die
Despite these recent developments in research on alternative
coding schemes, the idea of grandmother cells continues to
attract sporadic interest. In particular, Roy (2012, 2013, 2017)
published a series of opinion pieces and a conceptual analysis
defending the idea based on his proposal of a localist theory of
abstraction in the brain. This defense is noteworthy to complete
our failure analysis for two reasons. First, it exemplifies an
implicit disciplinary schism in explanations of the brain. Second,
it shows that the issues that challenge the idea of grandmother
cells are not of an isolated scientific concept, but of a broader
understanding of the brain. That is why the idea of grandmother
cells won’t simply die.
Data never just speaks for itself and no scientific concept ever
makes sense without its supportive framework. In neuroscience,
this mirrors an enhanced dilemma, as one reviewer pointed out.
Because research on the brain tends to be divided into two
approaches: On the one hand, there is the computational, more
abstract mechanistic style of analysis in cognitive psychology
and related disciplines interested in modeling information
theoretic systems. On the other hand, there is direct research
on biological, molecular and cellular mechanisms. The essential
tension, frequently separating these two perspectives, is that
computational models can remain divorced from biological
reality. Meanwhile, neuroscientific findings can lack proper
theoretical grounding – so much so that the nature of the data, as
determined by technology, often “masquerades as explanation”
(an expression I owe to said reviewer). This problem is illustrated
by many methodological debates; for example, the dilemma
of reverse inference in neuroimaging, such as fMRI analysis
(Poldrack, 2006, 2011).
Are some interpretations of the data promoted by inherited
yet debatable conceptual intuitions? What empirical issues are left
out that require proper explanation while being missed by not
subjecting certain philosophical preferences to failure analysis?
One such oversight concerns the mechanism of categorization
as information clustering; namely, how the brain acquires
and develops its information-specific activity. The previous
section indeed has shown that more than one explanation is
possible. It foregrounded an alternative where category-selective
cellular activity builds on association mechanisms (implemented
via sparse coding), instead of the hierarchical coding scheme
endorsed with the concept of grandmother cells.
Roy’s (2012, 2013, 2017) argument for grandmother cells, as a
special case of a semantic localist framework, is a good example
to highlight the divergence in assumptions here. Roy’s (2013, 1)
definition of grandmother cells is a follows: “a grandmother cell
represents a specific and complex concept, not merely a percept,
in a multimodal invariant way. Thus, the basic grandmother cell
notion is about encoding a complex concept within a single cell
in an invariant way. And abstract categories—such as animals,
cars, and houses—are, without question, complex concepts.
Category-type concepts, therefore, are part of (or included in)
the notion of grandmother cells. (. . . ) In a more general sense,
grandmother cells are fundamentally about abstraction and
generalization.” Roy’s argument for the existence of grandmother
cells involves four claims: (1) Cortical columns (clusters of cells
with similar receptive fields) are the fundamental functional
and computational unit in the neocortex. (2) There is localized
object- and category-selective cell activity. (3) The nature of
information processing in the brain is abstraction. In support
of this are recordings from modality-invariant cells. And (4) on
neural representation: there is no evidence for dense distributed
representation, population coding is too slow for fast neural
decision-making processes, and sparse coding is only used in the
encoding of memories. This leads Roy to claim, “at an abstract
level, the brain is a massively parallel, distributed computing
system that is symbolic.”
The biological foundation of neural processing does not
square with this conceptual design of the brain. Specifically, the
(1) functional significance of cortical columns, as an anatomical
and developmental structure, has been called into question
(e.g., Horton and Adams, 2005). Besides, (2) neither modality
invariant nor category-selective cell activity is sufficient to
indicate single-cell over sparse encoding of information, as
the previous section illustrated. Further, the conflation of
grandmother with concept cells in Roy potentially obscures
different coding and association processes; how the brain
identifies individual entities (my car) may not reside in processes
identical to categorization (a car). (3) Whether abstraction
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defines the ultimate nature of the brain is debatable; and even
if one pursues an abstraction-centered framework of the brain,
this premise is independent of localist or non-localist models of
a specific flavor. [Roy’s adopted computational understanding of
the cognition as symbol processing rests on Newell and Simon
(1976), who defined cognitive processing in computational terms,
not its instantiation in the brain. Such symbolic, representational
account is far from uncontested (e.g., McClelland et al., 1995;
Van Gelder, 1995)]. Lastly, (4) there is plenty of evidence
for distributed representation and population coding in
electrophysiological research that counters Roy’s description.
Over the past two decades, these findings, in invertebrates
but also vertebrates, resulted in experimentally driven, highly
sophisticated information processing models addressing
temporal dynamics and the encoding of multidimensional
stimuli, including non-visual information (e.g., Laurent, 2002).
Overall, there is sufficient experimental reason to question
not just grandmother cells but the implicit, overarching style of
reasoning in traditional localist theories of the brain (Burnston,
2016), or treating its function exclusively in terms of semantic or
language-based symbolic abstraction and representation (Keijzer,
2001; Chemero, 2009). Indeed a central problem that has plagued
more recent approaches to reviving the idea of grandmother cells
is the deeply problematic use of ad hoc hypotheses (Grünbaum,
1976); meaning the attempt to redefine a notion into existence by
repeatedly adjusting its definition in light of newer observations.
What makes this practice problematic is that it sidelines notable
observations that do not square with such definitional exercise.
A case in point is Quiroga et al. (2014) finding that, when faced
with ambiguous “concept” or “person” stimuli, neural responses
mirrored the subjective reports of the participant. This top-down,
decision-making component in stimulus-selective cell responses
gets buried in frameworks that want to fix the fundamentals of
neural coding by stimulus-specific single-cell responses.
But the critical point here is the mechanism of information
coding. What kind of computational mechanism undergirds
categorization and illustrates how the brain establishes neural
linkage in information processing? The previous section had
shown that the category-selective responses of cells could be
explained by associative learning via sparse coding. Roy’s explicit
rejection of this explanation resides in the claim that sparse
coding does not facilitate generalizations. A claim that is drawing
on his reading of McClelland et al. (1995), who “have argued
that sparse distributed representation doesn’t generalize very
well and that the brain uses it mainly for episodic memories in
the hippocampus” (Roy, 2017, 3). A closer look at McClelland
et al.’s original paper yields a different understanding. The
issue here is not the possibility of generalization per se (as the
process of categorization, including the learning of concepts
and recognition of examples), but the specific way conceptual
inference and classification is established and learned.
Basically, the decisive question is: Do we recognize (new)
instances or stimuli as belonging to a specific category based on
hierarchical semantic links, “as a short form of the statement
An X is a Y” (McClelland et al., 1995, 428)? Or do we build
generalizations via "the discovery of shared structure through
interleaved learning" (ibid.) McClelland et al. argue for the latter
on the basis of a connectionist model, involving sparse coding,
that offers an explanation of how associative learning facilitates
categorization. Such computational framework resonates with
the explanation advanced in the previous section, further
eroding the philosophical intuitions in favor of a hierarchical
semantic network (that had fueled appeals to grandmother
cells). McClelland et al. (1995, 428) had noted about the latter:
“Semantic networks of this type were very popular vehicles
for representation for a period of time in the 1970s, but
apparent experimental support (Collins and Quillian, 1969) for
the hypothesis that people’s knowledge of concepts is organized
in this way was illusionary (Rips et al., 1973).”
Such a difference in network modeling and the diverging
understanding of computational processing in the brain furthers
the conclusions in the previous sections: that failure analysis
helps us to identify and make conceptual choices in the
interpretation of experimental data. These choices, we saw now,
also concern the dilemma of how data really links with theory,
and vice versa, exemplified by the challenge of how to connect
highly theoretical models with detailed neurobiological evidence.
If we start analyzing some concepts explicitly as failures, how
does this advance our understanding of a subject matter –
such as information processing in the brain with examples like
grandmother cells?
Unconceived Hypotheses: Background
Cells?
There are multiple reasons why the idea of grandmother cells,
including the framework on which it rests, is ripe for failure
analysis. The plausibility of grandmother cells boiled down
to their descriptive function as a conceptual proxy (lacking a
proper mechanism) in a widely successful, associated framework;
namely, input driven, hierarchical coding in object recognition.
This framework remains prevalent to date. But, compared to the
1970s, for different reasons today.
Some deep learning trials and teaching resources continue
to work with the principal idea of grandmother cell coding
(e.g., Convolutional Neural Network or CNN) – which further
exemplifies the difference between the aims of computational
modeling and research that targets the real brain. While
coding schemes for grandmother cells are certainly possible to
implement in neural networks, and may be used in technological
applications, that procedure may not tell you about how
the brain works. In wet-lab neuroscience, grandmother cells
hardly find mention (perhaps with the exception of Barlow
(2009), who held on to his original neuron doctrine from
1972, involving single-cell coding). Meanwhile, the broader
change in understanding the mechanisms that undergird object
categorization and representation in neuroscience happened with
the increasing ability to record from multiple neurons and neural
populations (Sejnowski, 2014).
In addition, the monopoly of strictly input driven, hierarchical
coding has been called into question on several other grounds:
e.g., its underlying non-contextual localization paradigm
(Burnston, 2016); its visuocentric and input-driven model of
stimulus representation (Barwich, 2018b); as well as increasing
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evidence for the stark influence of experience on the formation
and maintenance of category-specific neural domains, such as
the fusiform face area (Livingstone et al., 2017). While such
concerns may not debunk traditional views of object recognition,
they do recommend revision. Lastly, the idea of grandmother
cells also mirrored central problems inherent in this broader
framework, like the “binding problem” (section “The Concept
and Its Name, Demetaphored”), which could be explained by
alternative models such as Prediction Error Minimization in
more recent proposals surrounding the predictive brain (Hohwy,
2013). In light of this, sticking with grandmother cells may not
be our best way forward.
Failure analysis, meaning the treatment of a concept explicitly
as a failure, can aid to identify and make choices regarding
our modeling assumptions in this context. Subjecting the idea
of grandmother cells to failure analysis means questioning its
implicit reasoning in order to develop alternative views. For
this, we need to carve out the conceptual choices that this
reasoning entails. Failure analysis, so understood, is primarily
a method, not an ontological commitment. It does not even
preclude the future discovery of grandmother cells. But it
does make clear the costs of keeping a withering concept
alive. The notion of grandmother cells was all about stimulus-
induced, foreground object formation. This sidelines other,
equally essential lines of inquiry.
Object recognition, under natural conditions, is part and
parcel with the distinction of environmental background. Focus
on the computational principles that underlie background rather
than object representation may foster significant discoveries.
Rose (1996, 884) highlighted the importance of this kind of
alternative inquiry: “It was Michael Arbib (. . .) who introduced
the analogy between vision and making an animated cartoon: first
a cel (a transparent sheet of celluloid) is laid down on which the
background is drawn; the sky, ground, clouds, trees and so on.
Then other cels are overlaid on which are drawn objects closer
and closer to the foreground: particularly characters and other
objects that move, in other words that change from frame to
frame. This is not only logical but also makes it easier to draw,
in that the same background can remain in place throughout the
scene, and only the foreground cels have to be redrawn.”
Should we assume the existence of “background cells”? Surely
not. However, background computation and object recognition
build upon the same perceptual processes. Rose (1996, 884)
continued: “In neural terms, we know that keeping track of
an animal’s location within its environment is, perhaps, one
function of the hippocampus (. . .). This system keeps a record
of what should be present in the environment, at least in
a familiar environment such as the animal’s home territory.
Against this background it is easy to detect any deviation from
the expected pattern of incoming stimulation, in other words
to detect novelty or change, to generate an arousal response
and an orienting reaction that directs attention to the novel
stimulus.” Rose’s suggestion here appears complementary to the
reasoning that drove Koch and others to think about sparse
coding: “Thanks to highly specialized cells, we recognize our
own grandmother immediately in the crowd of other elderly
ladies at the senior citizen home, without having to think
twice about it” (Koch quoted in Gaschler, 2006, 82). We
can memorize specific objects by their idiosyncratic features;
recognizing those requires their differentiation from background
noise and variation. Both background formation and object
recognition build on statistical learning and stimulus frequency;
processes that have taken center stage in current models in
cognitive neuroscience.
In sum, the reasoning embodied by grandmother cells
sidelined fruitful lines of inquiry. While picked up by
contemporary research, these lines were already present in the
1970s (e.g., in Neisser, 1976). Such “unconceived alternatives”
resonate with a phenomenon that the philosopher Stanford
(2006) found in the history of science: namely, that many notable
scientific ideas could have “made it” much earlier because their
delayed success was not due to an absence of data, but poverty
in conceiving the salience in evidence of alternatives. From
this perspective, failure analysis acts as a conceptual tool of
model pluralism without relativism: by making epistemic choices
explicit and to question the plausibility of our more widespread,
although implicit theoretical foundations.
CONCLUSION: FAILURE ANALYSIS
Failure in science has many flavors. This article offered one way
to use failure as an epistemic tool propeling scientific research;
asking: how to cope with potentially dead-end concepts? We
saw that thinking about failure in science is not only beneficial
if it leads directly toward future successes (e.g., as falsifications
of a hypothesis; such as the classic Michelson and Morley
experiment). Failures can also be fruitful if treated as failures in
their own right, including ambiguous or unresolved cases, and
without the need to prove or disprove a particular model – but as
a heuristic tool to conceive of viable alternatives. The capacity to
arrive at new insights and better models in science fundamentally
hinges on the identification of choices with pursuit-worthy
alternatives. But how to find promising options? One option is
to treat a concept as a failure by taking it apart to probe the
reasoning that fueled its conceptual foundation.
Let us to close with the meta-value of failure analysis.
Historical and philosophical studies of scientific concepts can
explain how scientific concepts developed, how their application
changed, and how their embedding in an overarching framework
would lead to different interpretations of the data today. Explicit
attention to failure here concerns the issue of whether an idea
has lost its heuristic power and is kept alive more as a remnant
of a framework that itself should be reconsidered in its defining
assumptions. Failure analysis consequently propels us to question
philosophical intuitions about scientific concepts. Regularly, such
intuitions do not reside in causal reasoning and are a product of
historical growth.
Intellectual intuition, as a historical outcome, constitutes a
non-negligible effect in the context of science communication
and funding. In science communication, details and background
are naturally shortened and omitted by appeal to conceptual
analogs with greater explanatory intuition. Consequently, the
layperson hears about science as a progressive, accumulative
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enterprise where older ideas lead to better ones – or are dropped.
Failure, in this context, gets perceived as catastrophic, not a
normal process of probing current understanding. However, all
ideas constitute an intellectual expression of their time. So they
routinely do not end up as failures because they were proven to
be fraudulent or evidently false, or had no observations associated
with them. Instead, they are gradually leaving active debate and
practice that moved on to a different style of explanation under
other frameworks by which to investigate phenomena.
Beyond the expert-layperson divide, we find similar rhetorical
and explanatory strategies and shortcuts implemented in science-
internal contexts, where they may not always be perceived
directly, or where rhetorical maneuvers are not thought of as
equally strong in their influence on judgments of theory and
experiment. This is a critical misconception, as historical studies
show. A case in point is Ceccarelli (2001) examination of the
rhetoric strategies in three influential interdisciplinary works:
Theodosius Dobzhansky’s Genetics and the Origin of Species;
Erwin Schrödinger’s What Is Life? The Physical Aspect of the
Living Cell; and Edward O. Wilson’s Consilience: The Unity of
Knowledge. – The latter notably analyzed as a failure.
Science communication bridges not simply the layman-expert
gap. It connects and disconnects practitioners in scientific
research. The increasing specialization, even within a particular
discipline such as neuroscience, implies a dilemma of multiple
kinds of expertise. To communicate the highly technical nature of
current research, scientists are encouraged to market its broader
“impact” and “relevance” beyond an expert niche. Thus they
link their studies to ideas more widely heard of, which have
recognition value.
This has its price. Conceptual shortcuts, analogies, and
metaphors – such as grandmother cells, next to countless other
examples like maps and machines – constituted great tools
throughout the history of science. But metaphorical thinking
has its risks, endangering us to overlook other significant
factors. As the cyberneticists Rosenblueth and Wiener cautioned:
“The price for metaphor is eternal vigilance.” (Lewontin, 2001)
Metaphors in science quickly develop a life of their own
(a successful albeit hotly debated example is the notion of
information from cybernetics that entered and transformed
genetics; Kay, 2000). The peril of metaphors is the temptation
to take them literally. The idea of the grandmother cell has
been such a case.
In the end, there are multiple ways of dealing with failures
in science. One option is to argue for the benefit of keeping
contested ideas such as grandmother cells alive, even as an
imperfect model of higher-level processing. Another, equally
instructive option, outlined here, is to use them explicitly as
failures to actively engage with our limits of understanding and
probe for blind spots.
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